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Winning, Losing, and the 
Quality of Democracy
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Abstract
Citizens who voted for a party that won the election are more satisfied with democracy than 
those who did not. This winner–loser gap has recently been found to vary with the quality of 
electoral democracy: the higher the quality of democracy, the smaller the gap. However, we do 
not know what drives this relationship. Is it driven by losers, winners, or both? And Why? Linking 
our work to the literature on motivated reasoning and macro salience and benefiting from the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project—covering 163 elections in 51 countries between 
1996 and 2018, our results show that the narrower winner–loser gap in well-established electoral 
democracies is not only a result of losers being more satisfied with democracy, but also of winners 
being less satisfied with their victory. Our findings carry important implications since a narrow 
winner–loser gap appears as a key feature of healthy democratic systems.
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democracy, motivated reasoning
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The “winner–loser gap” is one the most robust relationships documented in political sci-
ence. It refers to the fact that citizens who voted for a party that won the election are 
systematically more satisfied with the way their democratic regime works than those who 
voted for a party that lost the election (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; 
Curini et al., 2012; Dahlberg and Linde, 2016; Martini and Quaranta, 2019; Nadeau and 
Blais, 1993). While the existence of this gap is well-established, it has been pointed out 
that its size may be context-dependent. In a pioneering study, Anderson and Guillory 
(1997) have shown that formal institutional settings explain part of the cross-country 
variation in the magnitude of the gap (see also Anderson et al., 2005). Many scholars have 
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extended this kind of work by looking at other types of contextual features. Among oth-
ers, scholars have studied the moderating roles of the age, the quality and performance of 
democracy (Aarts and Thomassen, 2008; Dahlberg et al., 2015; Dahlberg and Linde, 
2016; Martini and Quaranta, 2019), the type of election (Singh et al., 2012), as well as the 
integrity of the electoral process (Fortin-Rittberger et al., 2017). Overall, this strand of 
literature suggests that the size of the winner–loser effect is indeed contingent on contex-
tual factors.
In this article, we build on work that has linked the size of the winner–loser gap in 
satisfaction with democracy (SWD) to indicators of democratic quality (Dahlberg and 
Linde, 2016; Martini and Quaranta, 2019). Like Dahlberg and Linde (2016), we argue 
that the winner–loser gap should be mitigated when democratic quality is high. However, 
our research differs from earlier work on the conditioning effect of democratic quality on 
two important accounts. First, we explicitly link the observed variation in the size of the 
winner–loser satisfaction gap in high-quality and low-quality democracies to the litera-
ture on motivated reasoning and macro salience (Daoust and Nadeau, 2020; Kunda, 1990; 
Lodge and Taber, 2000, 2013; Nadeau et al., 2019; Rohrschneider and Loveless, 2010). 
Second, we evaluate in detail how both winners’ and losers’ level of SWD is affected by 
the quality of democracy. While insightful, research examining between-country differ-
ences (such as the papers cited above) does not tell us who—winners, losers, or both—
contributes to the reduction of the winner–loser gap as the quality of electoral democracy 
improves. More specifically, this reduction in winners’ and losers’ evaluation of the func-
tioning of democracy can be a result of losers being more satisfied in high-quality democ-
racies, of winners being less satisfied in such contexts, or both.
To find out what are the factors that drive the moderation effect of quality of electoral 
democracy, we make use of the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 
(CSES) project, covering 163 elections in 51 countries between 1996 and 2018. A crucial 
advantage of this dataset compared to the ones used in previous work is that it offers, to 
our knowledge, more variance on this question in terms of contexts and, most impor-
tantly, in terms of quality of democracy.
Previewing our findings, we find evidence of a moderation effect of quality of democracy 
on the winner–loser gap. We also disentangle the drivers of that relationship and find that the 
narrower winner–loser gap in high-quality democracies is not only a result of losers being 
more satisfied, but also of winners reacting to victories less emphatically. This key result is 
robust to several alternative model specifications and various estimation strategies.
By shedding light on the mechanism behind the reduction of the winner–loser gap, these 
results deepen our knowledge of voters’ post-electoral reactions and nuance previous work 
that almost exclusively frames the moderating effect of democratic quality as resulting from 
variation in losers’ reactions to election outcomes. Our results also imply that officials seek-
ing to bolster confidence in democratic institutions should not only strengthen civic educa-
tion and improve the quality of the electoral administration but also communicate effectively 
with voters to reassure them about the integrity of the electoral process. Finally, our findings 
highlight the responsibility of all political candidates in the aftermath of elections to join 
their voices to reiterate their support for the electoral system.
Winning, Losing, and the Quality of the Electoral Process
When reviewing the literature on the contextual factors that moderate the size of the win-
ner–loser gap in SWD or political support, two themes emerge. First, perceptions about the 
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integrity of the electoral process appear very important in explaining citizens’ post-electoral 
reactions in democracies (Anderson et al., 2005; Birch, 2008; Fortin-Rittberger et al., 2017; 
Moehler, 2009; Norris, 2017, 2019). Second, the perceptions about electoral fairness are 
particularly important in explaining losers’ willingness to maintain a high level of SWD 
when facing a disappointed outcome (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; 
Dahlberg and Linde, 2016; Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Wagner et al., 2009).
In contrast to the literature’s focus on the role of losers, we build on insights from moti-
vated reasoning (Bolsen et al., 2014; Kunda, 1990; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Lodge and 
Taber, 2000, 2013; Redlawsk, 2002) to argue that the observed variation in the size of the 
winner–loser satisfaction gap in high-quality and low-quality democracies should depend 
on both winners’ and losers’ post-electoral reactions. The assumption that voters operate as 
motivated reasoners means that they attempt to hold on to their existing positive evaluations 
of political objects or outcomes. They can do so by only paying attention to new congruent 
information or by explaining away new incongruent messages to which they are exposed 
(Bolsen et al., 2014; Kernell and Mullinix, 2019; Kunda, 1990; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; 
Lodge and Taber, 2000; Mullinix, 2016; Taber and Lodge, 2006).
We argue in this article that this process of motivated reasoning, that has been studied 
with a focus on different political objects, also offers a compelling framework to under-
stand the emergence of post-electoral winner–loser gaps in levels of SWD (Kernell and 
Mullinix, 2019; Mullinix, 2016). Starting with the winners, a motivated reasoning frame-
work leads to the expectation that this group of voters—who are satisfied with the out-
come of the election—will seek for information that is consistent with their existing 
positive evaluations. Winners will seek information that confirms that their victory results 
from elections that were free and fair and discard evidence suggesting otherwise. Losers, 
on the other hand, should be more attentive to information that points out the unfairness 
of the electoral process and less receptive to evidence suggesting that they may have lost 
fair and square. Given that free and fair elections are central in citizens’ assessments of 
democracy, it follows that winners’ and losers’ different conclusions about the integrity of 
the electoral process will lead to different levels of satisfaction with the performance of 
their political institutions (Norris, 2019).
In sum, we argue that motivated reasoning will lead winners to search for information 
that is congruent with the idea that the electoral process is free and fair, resulting in higher 
levels of satisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions. The same type of 
motivations will reinforce doubts about the integrity of the electoral process in the minds 
of losers, which will lead them to report lower levels of SWD.
The Nature and Role of Information Environments in Low- 
and High-Quality Democracies
Oriented information quests should occur broadly, helping us to understand the presence 
of a winner–loser gap in SWD will appear across contexts (Anderson et al., 2005; Blais 
and Gélineau, 2007; Dahlberg and Linde, 2016). Proponents of the motivated reasoning 
approach, however, also acknowledge that voters’ information searches do not take place 
in a vacuum (Kernell and Mullinix, 2019; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Redlawsk et al., 2010). 
This means that motivated reasoners are likely exposed across time and space to different 
dosages of evidence that either comforts or challenges their existing beliefs and evalua-
tions about the election outcome. We argue in this article that the observed variation in the 
size of the winner–loser gap in satisfaction across contexts crucially depends on the 
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interaction between an individual-level psychological process, motivated reasoning, and 
the differences in the information environment in low- and high-quality democracies. 
With information environment, we mean the broader context in which information about 
the election is discussed, which includes media coverage, but also citizens’ direct experi-
ence and the unmediated communication of political, governmental, and non-governmen-
tal actors.
Scholars are well-aware of the role of contextual factors on citizens’ information envi-
ronment. In the words of Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010: 1034), for instance, “macro 
conditions affect the [national] information environment.” Though this macro perspective 
has been mostly used to predict under what conditions citizens chiefly rely on economic 
or political considerations when assessing their level of SWD (Christmann, 2018; Daoust 
and Nadeau, 2020; Rohrschneider and Loveless, 2010), the argument is of general scope, 
a point that Dahlberg et al. (2015: 27) also made when they wrote that “different types of 
democracies face different challenges and we may assume that this has consequences for 
explanations of democratic discontent.”1 Based on these insights, we think that the con-
sequences of citizens engaging in motivated reasoning after an election will vary accord-
ing to the quality of democracy, that is, how closely it matches the “ideal” liberal 
democracy, including most notably free and fair elections and freedom of expression 
(Dahl, 1971). This argument makes intuitive sense, given that the electoral process has 
often been characterized as nothing more than a “window dressing exercise for authori-
tarian politics” in low-quality democracies, whereas it is often praised in their high-qual-
ity counterparts as an efficient and fair mechanism “to ensure that political rulers are 
[. . .] accountable to the electorate” (Lührmann et al., 2017: 1).
The notion that information environments vary with quality of democracy is in line 
with a number of theoretical and empirical studies. First, starting with Przeworski (1991), 
a number of researchers have suggested that a democracy is “self-enforcing” when com-
peting parties, and most evidently losers, prefer the outcome of elections to the violent 
confrontations that would otherwise ensue if they refuse to accept their defeat.2 Second, 
the structure of incentives for parties to engage in electoral fraud or to raise doubts about 
the fairness of the electoral process differs markedly in high- and low-quality democracies. 
Hyde and Marinov (2014) show that fraudulent elections and overt defiance of electoral 
results are rarely witnessed in institutionalized democracies. They argue this reflects the 
fact that the probability of being caught is large in high-quality democracies, while the 
consequences of being portrayed as a sore loser may be highly detrimental. Incumbents in 
low-quality democracies to the contrary have “little incentive to push for clean elections 
because they might face accusations of fraud . . . regardless of their true behavior” (Hyde 
and Marinov, 2014: 329). Third, low-quality democracies are characterized by an incum-
bent’s informational advantage due to the government control over the counting of the vote 
and the release of results which is susceptible to produce, according to Chernykh and 
Slovik (2015: 408) “a failure of self-enforcing democracy.” In brief, because parties have 
no interest in stealing elections and contesting electoral outcomes in high-quality democra-
cies, contestations remain rare and, consequently, the media have usually nothing to report 
about these types of events—the opposite being true in low-quality democracies.3
The preceding arguments are consistent with the idea that differences in terms of qual-
ity of democracy should affect both the amount and the diversity of available information 
related to electoral fairness, such as attention for potential manipulations of the voting 
process or electoral administrative practices that benefit some contestants over others 
(Birch, 2008; Daxecker et al., 2019; Goodwin-Gill, 1994; Moehler, 2009; Mozaffar and 
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Schedler, 2002; Norris, 2017, 2019; Norris et al., 2014). What are the implications for los-
ers? In low-quality democracies, they will be exposed to larger amounts and more diverse 
pieces of information related to electoral integrity than in high-quality democracies. Hence, 
losers in such settings are more likely to be exposed to information that could strengthen 
their doubts about the fairness of the electoral process. In this way, losers may start to 
doubt the possibility of becoming tomorrow’s winners—hence, decreasing their level of 
satisfaction with the democratic regime (Anderson and Mendes, 2006; Daxecker et al., 
2019; Moehler, 2009; Norris, 2019). The opposite is likely to be true in high-quality 
democracies. In the absence of information that questions the integrity of the election, 
partisans of defeated candidates are more likely to accept the outcome of the election and 
to “loose happily” (Dahlberg and Linde, 2016). For winners, we expect a similar effect of 
motivated reasoning differentially amplifying the effects of the election outcomes in low- 
and high-quality democracies. Winners in achieved liberal democracies are less likely to 
be exposed to information and cues that will prompt them to interpret the victory as the 
most decisive indication of the fairness of the electoral process than what holds in low-
quality democracies (Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; McAllister and White, 2011; Moehler, 
2009). Furthermore, in high-quality democracies, winning likely does not strengthen citi-
zens’ assessments of the performance of the electoral system to the same extent than is the 
case in low-quality democracies. As a result, winning in achieved liberal democracies will 
not have the same impact on expressed levels of SWD as in low-quality democracies.4
A key trait of the information environment is thus how much coverage there is about 
electoral fairness and to what extent views on this issue diverge. Differences between 
low- and high-quality contexts on this point are driven by the level of elite and media 
polarization about the integrity of the electoral process (Cantú and García-Ponce, 2015; 
Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; Moehler, 2009). In emergent democracies, winning and los-
ing candidates, and media outlets that are ideologically close to either the winners or the 
losers, will tend to offer divergent interpretations about the meaning of electoral out-
comes. Whereas winners will likely interpret the results as the legitimate outcome of a 
fair electoral process, and might portray their opponents as sore losers, defeated candi-
dates are more likely to claim that the elections were fraudulent and to denounce their 
opponents’ victory as illegitimate. Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013: 630), for instance, con-
clude from their study of elections in Latin America that “political losers often exaggerate 
the electoral malpractices in order not to accept their own responsibility in the electoral 
defeat and to retain the support of their electoral bases.” This type of polarization around 
the election outcome stands in sharp contrast with the consensual tone of elite and media 
discourse in the aftermath of national elections in established democracies. In this case, 
losers, the media, and evidently winners, are in agreement and concur to recognize the 
legitimacy of electoral outcomes (Anderson et al., 2005; Corcoran, 1994; Esaiasson, 
2011; Nadeau and Blais, 1993).5
It should be noted that work studying motivated reasoning has shown that being 
exposed to incongruent messages can sometimes produce boomerang (or “backlash”) 
effects (Kunda, 1990; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). For instance, partisans 
may become even more positive about a candidate they like after learning something 
negative about that candidate (Lodge and Taber, 2013; Redlawsk et al., 2010). The impli-
cation is that winner–loser gaps should be larger in low-quality democracies than in 
achieved liberal democracies because both winners and losers are exposed to the discom-
forting messages that are communicated by opponents and to the confirmatory cues trans-
mitted by fellow partisans. These messages should reinforce each other to bolster positive 
6 Political Studies 00(0)
assessments of electoral and political institutions among winners and to strengthen the 
negative evaluations that losers hold. This combined effect should not occur in high-
quality democracies, because voters in such settings will be largely exposed to the same 
messages from their preferred and rival candidates. That is, both groups of parties will 
recognize the fairness of the electoral process and the legitimacy of the election outcome. 
As the elites are basically in agreement about the integrity of the electoral process, voters 
are not exposed to partisan messages that are susceptible to polarize them.
In summary, we argue that information environments are crucial to the process of 
motivated reasoning and can either amplify or limit citizens’ efforts to find information 
that is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs about the state of democracy. In low-
quality democracies, losers and winners will find more arguments in the elite and media 
discourse to strengthen or challenge their beliefs that the electoral process is unfair (for 
losers) or fair (for winners) than what holds in high-quality democracies. This reasoning 
implies that the observed variation in the size of the winner–loser gap in satisfaction 
across contexts crucially depends on the interaction between an individual-level psycho-
logical process driving losers’ and winners’ post-electoral reactions (i.e. motivated rea-
soning) and the differences in the information environment faced by both groups in 
low- and high-quality democracies. Furthermore, we have argued that similar mecha-
nisms are at play for both winners and losers. The arguments presented above lead to our 
two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The higher the quality of electoral democracy, the smaller is the positive 
effect of winning on citizens’ level of SWD.
Hypothesis 2. The higher the quality of electoral democracy, the smaller is the nega-
tive effect of losing on citizens’ level of SWD.
Data and Methods
To test our hypotheses, we use all available modules of the CSES project (CSES, 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c, 2018).6 The CSES includes information from a common module of ques-
tions that participating countries integrate in their respective national election study. A 
measure of SWD was included in each of the five modules, implying we are able to use a 
uniquely comprehensive dataset that includes 163 elections in 51 countries and that cov-
ers a time period of two decades (1996–2018). The main advantage of this dataset com-
pared to the ones used in previous work (Dahlberg and Linde, 2016; Martini and Quaranta, 
2019) is that it offers more variance in terms of contexts and, most importantly, in terms 
of quality of democracy.
Our dependent variable is citizens’ level of SWD. Theoretical work distinguishes 
between dimensions of political support that focus on different objects—including sup-
port for the principle of democracy, assessments of regime performance, and evaluations 
of specific institutions or actors (Easton, 1975; Linde and Ekman, 2003; Norris, 1999). 
Among the different dimensions of political support, SWD should be thought of as more 
concrete than measures that tap citizens’ views of democratic principles but as more dif-
fuse than evaluations about the government in place or specific political actors. In this 
study, we rely on the conventional item of SWD used in the CSES project to assess citi-
zens’ evaluations of how the democratic system as a whole, works in practice (Bernauer 
and Vatter, 2012; Claasen, 2020; Harteveld et al., 2021). The item reads “On the whole, 
Nadeau et al. 7
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy works in [country]?” We rescaled this item to run from 0 (not at all satis-
fied) to 3 (very satisfied). To ease the estimation and interpretation of the effects, we use 
mixed-effects linear regression models to explain variation in citizens’ levels of SWD.
As previously explained, we theorize that winners and losers will report different lev-
els of satisfaction with the performance of the democratic regime, and that the extent to 
which they do so is context-dependent. To test our hypotheses, it is crucial that we distin-
guish between winners and losers and their informational environments. To do so in a 
straightforward way, we estimate their levels of SWD in comparison to that of a third 
category: Abstainers. This group is generally known to have lower levels of SWD (Rich 
and Treece, 2018), though there is some debate on the question whether their lower level 
of SWD is a cause or a consequence of their decision to vote or abstain (Kostelka and 
Blais, 2018). To measure voter turnout, we rely on respondents’ self-reported turnout in 
the election under study.7 For distinguishing between winners and losers, we take a con-
ventional approach and define winners as all those who voted a party that is part of the 
government, that is, that obtained at least one governmental portfolio (Stiers et al., 2018).
Our reasoning implies that the size of the winner–loser gap in SWD across contexts 
depends on the interaction between the motivated reasoning process driving winners’ and 
losers’ post-electoral reactions and the differences in the information environment faced by 
both groups in low- and high-quality democracies in the aftermath of elections. Based on 
the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence presented in the last section, we argue 
that messages calling into question the fairness of the electoral process are more frequent 
and visible in low-quality democracies than it is the case in high-quality democracies.
To measure the quality of democracy of the countries covered by the CSES, we rely on 
the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2018b). In particular, we 
use their “Electoral democracy index” (v2x_polyarchy), which is meant to capture “the 
extent to which electoral democracy in its fullest sense [is] achieved.” The index accounts, 
among others, for the presence of electoral competition, extensive suffrage, freedom of 
association and expression, the presence of independent media, and clean elections 
(Coppedge et al., 2018a: 38). In the estimation sample, the mean score on the index that 
can theoretically vary between 0 and 1 is 0.82 (standard deviation = 0.14). All indicators 
are sources from the V-Dem dataset and are described in detail in the Online Appendix A.
Even though measures of the quality of the democratic process do not directly capture 
the extent to which citizens are exposed to messages denouncing electoral fraud, such 
indicators appear strongly correlated with electoral contestation. We note, for example, 
that electoral violence, captured by Daxecker et al. (2019), correlates strongly with our 
indicator of electoral democracy (Pearson’s r of −0.44 for the countries included in the 
Daxecker et al. dataset on electoral violence). Also telling is the correlation of −0.59 
observed between the V-Dem measure with an indicator developed by Hyde and Marinov 
(2012, 2014, 2019) measuring the presence of concerns about the fairness of the electoral 
process before elections. All in all, these indications seem to indicate that the V-Dem 
indicator represents a useful way to differentiate the informational environments around 
elections faced by winners and losers in low- and high-quality democracies.
To test our hypotheses, we minimize an estimation bias by including several covari-
ates. At the macro-level, we account for differences in economic growth and economic 
inequality (Christmann, 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2015; Donovan and Karp, 2017; Sirovátka 
et al., 2019; Solt, 2020). In particular, we add a measure of the annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth and the Gini index of inequality (both obtained from the World 
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Bank). At the individual-level, we include controls for sex, age (linear), education (using 
the CSES harmonized scale with five categories), income (quintiles), and a variable dis-
tinguishing between respondents feeling close to a political party. Missing information on 
some of these controls imply that some country-years are excluded from the CSES data, 
we provide details on these exclusions in the Online Appendix B. Descriptive statistics of 
all variables are reported in Online Appendix C.
The data have a nested structure, which we account for by estimating mixed effect models 
with a three-level structure: individuals nested in elections nested in countries (Gelman and 
Hill, 2006).8 We specify random intercepts at the election level and, given our interest in the 
cross-level interaction between winning/losing/abstaining and the level of democracy, we 
also specify random slopes for the variables that capture winning/losing/abstaining.
Results
The results of our analyses are shown in Table 1. We present two models, one that focuses 
on the main effects of winning and losing (compared to abstainers) on citizens’ SWD and 
one that includes cross-level interactions with our indicator of democratic quality. First, 
the estimates of Model 1 show that both winners and losers are significantly more satis-
fied with democracy than those who abstain from voting. Importantly, the coefficient for 
Table 1. Explaining Satisfaction with Democracy.
Model 1 Model 2
 b SE b SE
Winner (ref. = abstain) 0.244*** 0.005 0.626*** 0.098
Loser (ref. = abstain) 0.049*** 0.005 −0.256*** 0.076
Index of electoral democracy 0.505* 0.203 0.572** 0.205
Winner × Electoral democracy −0.444*** 0.119
Loser × Electoral democracy 0.375*** 0.092
Female −0.013*** 0.003 −0.017*** 0.003
Age −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
Education 0.007*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.001
Income 0.034*** 0.001 0.033*** 0.001
Partisan 0.107*** 0.004 0.102*** 0.004
GDP growth 0.030*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.005
Gini −0.004 0.005 −0.005 0.005
Intercept 0.851** 0.264 0.791** 0.266
σ2 countries, intercept 0.098 0.099  
σ2 elections, intercept 0.020 0.017  
σ2 elections, loser 0.022  
σ2 elections, winner 0.043  
(N) countries 51 51  
(N) elections 163 163  
(N) individuals 190136 190136  
Source: CSES Module 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
GDP: gross domestic product; SE: standard error.
Coefficients and standard errors of mixed-effects linear models.
Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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winners is almost five times larger than that for losers. This difference in winners’ and 
losers’ level of SWD is not surprising and confirms the presence of a substantial winner–
loser gap in SWD in our data. These findings therefore suggest that the observations from 
Dahlberg and Linde (2016) can be generalized more broadly and do not apply to European 
democracies only. Furthermore, it is worth to note that the estimates for the control vari-
ables in Model 1 are in line with expectations.
Model 2 includes interaction terms between the winner- and loser-variables and the indica-
tor of electoral democracy. Their inclusion allows testing whether the effects of winning (ver-
sus abstaining) and losing (versus abstaining) are moderated by the quality of democracy. The 
coefficients of these interaction terms are in line with our hypotheses. First, the results show 
that the positive effect of winning on SWD is significantly reduced when the electoral democ-
racy index is higher (i.e. a negative interaction effect, in line with H1). Second, the negative 
effect of losing on SWD as well is significantly smaller in settings with a higher electoral 
democracy score (i.e. a positive interaction effect, in line with H2). In other words, compared 
with what holds for low-quality democracies, losers in high-quality democracies are more 
satisfied with democracy and winners are less satisfied with democracy. We illustrate this 
effect in Figure 1 that shows the average marginal effect of winning (vs abstaining) and losing 
(vs abstaining) for different values of the V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index.
Combined, the estimates of Model 2 in Table 1 offer strong support for our hypotheses: 
not only do losers lose less in high-quality democracies, but winners win less as well. The 
smaller winner–loser gap in high-quality democracies appears to be the result of a “scis-
sors effect” shown in Figure 1, whereby the marginal effects of winning and losing move 
in opposite directions as the quality of democracy increases.
Robustness of the Results
The estimates that are presented in Table 1 and that are illustrated in Figure 1 are the result 
of carefully specified models. Still, some might be concerned that our results may be 
Figure 1. Average Marginal Effect of Voting for a Loser and of Voting for the Winner on SWD, 
by Level of Electoral Democracy.
SWD: satisfaction with democracy.
Average marginal effect (AME) and 95% confidence intervals of losing versus abstention (black circles) and 
of winning versus abstention (hollow circles), by level of electoral democracy, are displayed. Estimates are 
obtained using Model 2 in Table 1.
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biased due to the selection of the V-Dem indicator as a moderating variable, the use of 
abstainers as a reference category, the limited number of controls (which raises the pos-
sibility of an omitted variable bias), or that they could be driven by particular elections or 
countries in the dataset. In this section, we address these concerns in turn.
First, in studying the conditioning effect of quality of electoral democracy, we have 
focused on a broad summary indicator of democratic quality, the V-Dem’s polyarchy 
index which combines information on freedom of association, freedom of expression, the 
share of the population that has the right to vote, the organization of free and fair elec-
tions, and whether the chief executive and legislative institutions are appointed through 
elections (see Online Appendix A for a detailed description presentation of these compo-
nents). Arguably, not all indicators in this index are as theoretically relevant for the mech-
anisms we describe and test in this article. For example, we would not expect how wide 
suffrage in a country is to significantly moderate the size of the winner/loser gap. In 
contrast, freedom of expression and the presence of free and fair elections should have the 
expected moderating effect. A series of supplementary analyses, reported in Online 
Appendix D, show evidence that supports this expectation. We have also verified the 
robustness of our results when relying on alternative indicators of democratic quality. 
Online Appendix E replicates the analyses with a focus on three different indicators from 
the Sustainable Government Indicators; capturing quality of democracy, rule of law, and 
electoral democracy. These analyses replicate our main findings, consistently pointing 
out that winners win less and losers lose less, as democratic quality increases
Second, some might argue that using abstainers as a reference category also entails 
some limitations, in particular, because the share of abstainers varies with a country’s 
level of quality of electoral democracy (Pearson’s r between the share of abstainers and 
the V-Dem polyarchy index is −0.22). However, as can be seen from Online Appendix F, 
when excluding abstainers from the analyses, and contrasting losers and winners, we still 
find indications of a strong moderating effect of the quality of democracy on both groups 
post-electoral reactions.
Third, at the macro-level in particular, one may raise the concern that our models 
include few controls. To recall, in addition to the indicators of democratic variables, our 
specifications include two measures of economic performance—economic growth and 
inequality—that have previously been linked to the vote choice, as well as to SWD. We 
know, however, that system-level variables such as the political or electoral system are 
also correlated with SWD (Aarts and Thomassen, 2008). To ensure that heterogeneity in 
system-level variables and other omitted country-level variables does not drive the results, 
we have checked whether the results hold when including country fixed effects in the 
models. The inclusion of these country fixed effects implies that we are analyzing within-
country variation in SWD. As can be seen from the results that are reported in Online 
Appendix G, our conclusions are robust to this very strong control. When examining 
within-country variation in the winner–loser gap over time, we also find that when demo-
cratic quality is higher, winners win less, and losers lose less.
Fourth, though the validity of the SWD measure as an indicator of regime support is 
generally accepted in a European context (Ferrín, 2016), there is more debate about cross-
national variation in what the measure taps in other regions (see, for example, Canache 
et al., 2001). While we think the issue of measurement invariance is more problematic for 
work that is interested in comparing levels of SWD than for an analysis of winner/loser 
gaps in SWD, it remains important to acknowledge that between-country variation in the 
content of the SWD measure might bias our results. With respect to this point as well, it 
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is important to highlight that our results remain intact when including country fixed 
effects (see Online Appendix G). In the same vein, even though it has been shown that 
SWD has remained fairly stable over time (Van Ham et al., 2017), we verify whether the 
results hold when accounting for temporal variation by means of the inclusion of module 
fixed effects. As can be seen from Online Appendix H, when accounting for differences 
in SWD between the five CSES-modules, our results still hold.
Furthermore, one might also question the absence of important individual-level varia-
bles in our models. For instance, we argue that the winner/loser gap varies with a country’s 
level of electoral democracy because citizens faced different post-electoral environments 
in low- and high-quality democracies characterized by noticeable differences in the bal-
ance and visibility of post-electoral communication flows about the fairness of the elec-
toral process. Given the theorized role of citizens’ reactions to different information 
environments in our explanation of post-electoral winner/loser gaps, it could be argued 
that citizens’ level of political knowledge is an important omitted variable in our specifica-
tions, or that the effects reported in Table 1 are limited to high politically informed citizens. 
Additional analyses reported in Online Appendix I show that it is not the case—suggesting 
that these effects are not driven by a small group of highly informed citizens.
Finally, we verify the influence of single elections on our results by excluding one 
election at a time from the estimation sample (i.e. jackknife tests). The results of these 
tests, which are reported in Online Appendix J, show that the coefficients of the interac-
tion terms “Winner × Electoral democracy index” and “Loser × Electoral democracy 
index” are very robust to excluding election-years from the analyses—signaling that the 
influence of specific elections on our results is limited. While the “Winner × Electoral 
democracy index” is not always significant at the 0.05 level, the size of the coefficient is 
substantively very similar across the 163 estimations.
Discussion
Our results confirm previous findings on the moderating role of democratic quality on the 
winner–loser gap in SWD. While there is some debate on this question (Dahlberg and 
Linde, 2016; Martini and Quaranta, 2019), our data—that include substantial variation in 
terms of democratic quality—suggest that previous findings can be generalized beyond 
Europe: when democratic quality is higher, the gap between winners’ and losers’ SWD is 
substantially reduced.
Most importantly, our results shed light on what drives the smaller winner–loser gap 
in high-quality democracies. While previous research has almost exclusively focused on 
the reactions of losers, our results suggest that both winners and losers contribute to 
reduction of the winner–loser gap. Therefore, when democratic quality is high, not only 
do losers lose less, winners also appear to win less. Winners’ reactions can theoretically 
drive the winner–loser gap as much as those of losers, depending on who moves and by 
how much. Our results reinforce the inclusion of winners in studies of public opinion 
toward the democratic regime.
These findings entail important implications at the empirical and the theoretical level. 
Empirically, the fact that we disentangle effects among winners and losers allows for a 
better understanding of the dynamics that explain the between-country variation in the 
winner–loser gap. Rather than speculating about the symmetry of the post-electoral reac-
tions of winners and losers, or remaining agnostic about the distinctive behavior of both 
groups, our analytical approach allows opening the black box of the winner–loser gap 
(Rich and Treece, 2018).
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Theoretically, our results confirm the relevance and the richness of conceptualizing citi-
zens’ post-electoral reactions as the result of the interaction between the well-documented 
individual-level psychological process of motivated reasoning (Kernell and Mullinix, 
2019; Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006) and the varying “informational environments 
around elections” they faced across time and space (Daxecker, 2019; Hyde, 2012; Hyde 
and Marinov, 2014; Kelley, 2012; Norris, 2019; Slovik and Chernykh, 2015). This fruitful 
perspective neatly suggests that the between-country variation in the winner/loser gap 
results from the interaction of winners’ and losers’ searches for comforting post-electoral 
facts and different informational environments.
That being said, recent events and instances of increasing affective polarization in 
established democracies (Gidron et al., 2020; Iyengar et al., 2019) ask for a certain 
amount of caution in the characterization of high-quality democracies as environments 
where the outcome of the election is always widely accepted and hardly debated. The 
aftermath of the US 2020 presidential election in particular is seemingly at odds with 
this characterization. As a matter of fact, following the 2016 US presidential election 
too, a significant number of American citizens were skeptical about the integrity of the 
electoral process (Norris et al., 2020). This point is important, as it suggests that even 
among what are generally considered “high-quality democracies” there can be varia-
tion in the extent to which election results are covered and interpreted in a consensual 
way. At the same time, it is worth noting that major disruptions in the perception of 
electoral integrity, like those following the 2020 US presidential election, should be 
captured by the indicators we rely on. It is reassuring in that regard to observe that the 
V-Dem’s polyarchy index for the US was in 2020 at its lowest level in over 40 years. 
To the extent that a surge in election contestations in recent years indeed occurs, that 
should thus be captured by the data, and result in larger winner/loser gaps in SWD.9
Our results also carry important implications about the significance of the winner–
loser gap as an indicator of a democracy’s vitality. A small winner–loser gap is a prefer-
able outcome, as it signals that neither winners nor losers are interpreting electoral 
outcomes as serious indications of electoral fraud. Winner–loser gaps take an entirely 
different meaning in low-quality democracies. In such settings, winner–loser gaps are 
worrisome when “winners give their leaders the benefits of the doubt . . . and losers . . . 
assume the worst” (Moehler, 2009: 360). Neither of these reactions is good news for the 
stability and consolidation of democratic systems when “democracy is not the only game 
in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996).
Our results finally provide a powerful reminder that citizens’ confidence in the 
electoral process represents a vital form of political support that should never be taken 
for granted, even in established democracies (Karp et al., 2018; Norris, 2017). Civic 
education programs and, above all, competent and credible third-party actors—elec-
toral commissions, courts, and observers—are crucial for bolstering citizens’ trust in 
the electoral process (Hyde and Marinov, 2012, 2014; Norris, 2019; Slovik and 
Chernykh, 2015). But neither of these pre-requisites spares electoral officials from 
communicating effectively and political candidates from behaving responsibly in the 
aftermath of elections to strengthen citizens’ confidence in the fairness of the electoral 
process (Bowler, 2016).
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Notes
1. Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) adopt a “framing emphasis” perspective (Chong and Druckman, 2007) 
to suggest that national contexts influence the weight citizens attach to economic and political considera-
tions when they evaluate their political institutions (see Daoust and Nadeau, 2020 or Nadeau et al., 2019 for 
recent examples on satisfaction with democracy (SWD)). Although we share the same macro perspective 
as these authors, our approach is different. First, motivated reasoning is central to our argument. Second, 
other dimensions of the information environment are at play in our explanation, including the quantity (high 
in low-quality democracies, low in high-quality democracies) and the diversity (polarized in low-quality 
democracies, consensual in high-quality democracies) of information about the issue of electoral fairness.
2. On the notion of self-enforcing democracy, see Przeworski (2005, 2008) and Apolte (2018). On the par-
ticular role of elections as a “self-enforcing mechanism,” see Fearon (2011), Hyde and Marinov (2014), 
and Chernykh and Slovik (2015).
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3. The work on electoral monitoring is also consistent with the argument that information environments vary 
in low- and high-quality democracies. According to this stream of research, the rarity of stolen elections and 
electoral conflicts in high-quality democracies make electoral monitoring less crucial for reinsuring voters 
about the fairness of the electoral process. In low-quality democracies, in contrast, international electoral 
monitoring plays a dual role. The first one is to ensure the integrity of the electoral process. The second, 
and perhaps even more important role, is to solve the central information problem in low-quality democra-
cies. That is, to convince suspicious citizens flooded with contrariwise information about the fairness of the 
electoral process (see Chernykh and Slovik, 2015; Daxecker et al., 2019; Hyde and Marinov, 2012, 2014).
4. Ample evidence suggests that winners’ and losers’ assessments of the fairness of the electoral process 
differ in low- and high-quality democracies. Furthermore, this work also shows that the effect of citizens’ 
assessments of the fairness of the electoral process on their level of SWD also varies in low- and high-
quality democracies. Moehler (2009: 360) for instance concludes that “winner status in Africa is positively 
related to the perception of a free and fair election [and] has the largest influence on evaluations of elec-
toral integrity in both substantive and statistical terms.” Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013: 610) note that “trust 
in elections is quite low in Latin America” and conclude that the presence of irregularities that mark the 
electoral processes in this region may explain losers’ inclination to denounce “that the elections had been 
manipulated by the incumbent government.” McAllister and White (2011: 676) reach the same conclusion 
about Russian elections when they observe that the impact of being on the winning side in predicting that 
an election will be perceived to be fair “is greater than all the other independent variables combined.” 
Norris, 2019: 14) rounds up the picture when she concludes, based on her extensive study of citizens’ 
perceptions of electoral integrity in 62 countries, that the gap between winners and losers was particularly 
strong in countries with have held a long series of contests and conflict . . . By contrast, there often tended 
to be more modest gaps between winners and losers in countries . . . which experts suggest reflected inter-
national standard of integrity (Norris, 2019: 14).
5. We can easily ground these considerations in real-life elections around the world. The case of the fiercely 
debated 1988 national election in Canada is exemplary. This election was fought over an emotionally 
laden and extremely divisive issue, namely the signature of a Free Trade agreement between Canada 
and the USA. After the election, the leader of the winning party and the media interpreted the outcome 
of the election as having provided the re-elected conservative government with a clear and legitimate 
mandate to implement the agreement. Even though the winning party was far from receiving a majority 
of the vote (the Conservative Party received 43% while its two main opponents both opposed to the Free 
Trade Agreement, the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party secured 32% and 20% of the vote, 
respectively), the leaders of the two main opposition parties publicly conceded that democracy had to be 
respected. They had fought almost exclusively on this issue and had been beaten, concluding the trade 
deal had to go through. This type of peaceful outcome stands in sharp contrast with the clash between 
the defeated opposition leader Salvador Nasralla and the re-elected incumbent president Juan Orlando 
Hernandez over the outcome of the 2017 presidential election of Honduras. Whereas Nasralla challenged 
the results, asked for another election and denounced massive fraud and irregularities, Hernandez called 
on the country’s leaders to accept his re-election, accused his main opponent of trying to “steal the elec-
tion” and emphatically concluded in a televised speech that “the people have spoken and it only remains 
to comply with their will, expressed freely at the ballot box”—see Malkin (2017).
6. For Module 5, we include the data that were made available in the May 2020 early release.
7. Such a measure overestimates actual turnout (Selb and Munzert, 2013). Despite this obvious limitation, it 
should be noted that recent work has shown that this underestimation does not have dramatic implications 
when studying the correlates of abstention (Achen and Blais, 2016).
8. A list of all elections (and observations by election) included in the analyses can be found in Online 
Appendix C.
9. As previously mentioned, we rely on a continuous indicator of democratic quality (V-Dem’s polyarchy 
index) to operationalize the quality of democracy in the elections included in the dataset. As such, the 
indicator can capture important nuances between countries and within countries over time—allowing us 
to study the role of democratic quality beyond overly broad categorizations of countries that are gener-
ally considered high- or low-quality democracies. This feature of the indicator also implies it can capture 
recent trends of democratic backsliding, as it seemed to have happened in the US. To the extent that there 
is democratic backsliding, the implication of our theory is that this will result in larger winner/loser gaps.
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